AI摘要 期刊+AI小助手
该研究探讨了新闻媒体为争夺公众关注而发布虚假信息的现象,并提出了一个量化模型来分析其利弊。研究发现,在“注意力经济”驱使下,媒体倾向于使用煽动性语言甚至制造假新闻以提高参与度,但这会损害长期信誉。研究者Amini等人采用零和博弈和量子响应均衡理论,建立模型追踪媒体可信度、报道准确性和受众观点演变。模型显示,当一方采用假新闻策略时,其他媒体被迫跟进,形成“军备竞赛”,加剧受众极化和回音室效应。尽管模型能描述这一现象,但无法判定媒体决策的具体动机。研究者强调,提升媒体素养教育可有效降低盲目信从风险。

const container = document. getElementById("shadow-container"); const shadow = container. attachShadow({ mode: "open" }); shadow. innerHTML = ` . box {color: green; border: 0px; padding:0px; }Click on the blue characters above to follow us. In this issueof Science Advances, a new model describes how news media publish false information in order to compete for public attention. The method of publishing false information is described. These findings portray a trend(or the so-called “arms race”):the tendency to publish extremely partisan fake news to increase audience participation. The model may help researchers quantify the long-term trade-off between the immediate benefits of false information to news organizations(such as increased website traffic)and long-term damage(such as damaged reputation). Study author Arash Amini and colleagues pointed out: “Our results highlight the effectiveness of educational initiatives aimed at improving media literacy and reducing information blindness. By equipping individuals with the skills to better assess the credibility of the information they receive, the risk of blind compliance with information in the entire community can be effectively reduced. ”Under the coercion of today's “attention-oriented” economy, in order to compete for user attention,news media will compete to adopt more ostentatious language and more inflammatory narrative techniques, Don't even hesitate to create fake news to increase reader engagement. Although sharing false information has become a strategy to expand audiences, this method can damage credibility and may have long-term negative effects. In order to quantify its pros and cons, the author of the study, Amini et al., developed a test model. They use a zero-sum game approach, that is, media organizations (or participants) must choose between disseminating true and false information to their audiences. This method relies on a premise called quantum response equilibrium, that is, game participants can only make certain rational choices in the decision-making process. The model defines the evolution of each participant's influence by monitoring the credibility of participants, the proportion of accurate reports, and the existing view of the audience. By comparing the distribution of false information exposure and the reputation-public opinion curve, the output of this model is highly consistent with the real-world news model. It also describes the way of a possible “arms race” between news media. When one party resorts to fake news, the other must adopt the same strategy to compete. The model further portrays how this “arms race” will intensify the polarization of the audience and lead to an echo chamber effect. Although the model of Amini et al. can describe this ”arms race" model, they are still cautious to point out that the model cannot reveal the specific motivations behind the decision-making of news organizations. The author's team explained: "In other words, we cannot clearly label news media that strategically use false information as malicious media behavior, because their decision-making may be formed through repeated interactions. That is to say, information distortion is a natural result of extreme partisanship within the media.“Click to share, click to like, click to like, this article comes from hereSCIENTIFEAAAS, If there is any infringement, please contact the website administrator to delete it. `;